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CASE STUDY 4: LAWYER FOR A COALITION OF
ORGANIZATIONS WITH AN INFORMAL LEADER
Scott L. Cummings*
Michael Haber**
1. CASE FACTS

Organization A ("A-Org") is a statewide section 501(c)(4)
advocacy group with five offices, including a local office in B Town, a
low-income community of color.' It is the biggest and most
sophisticated advocacy group in B Town due to the experienced
leadership at its central office and because it is one of very few
organizations in the community with a full-time staff.
When a housing developer came to B Town, making promises
about jobs and affordable housing, while advancing zoning changes
through local government agencies that would permit luxury condos and
cause rampant displacement, A-Org decided to launch a maj or campaign
to either stop the project or fight for a Community Benefits Agreement
("CBA")-a written contract that would specify benefits the
development would provide to the community and remedies for failing
to meet benchmarks. A-Org called every potential ally it could find:
local elected officials, small business owners, local labor groups,
churches and faith groups, and every community-based organization in
the area. Few of these groups were sophisticated about real estate
development, and some even accepted the developer's spin, but A-Org
* Robert Henigson Professor of Legal Ethics and Professor of Law, University of
California, Los Angeles School of Law.
** Associate Clinical Professor of Law, Maurice A. Deane School of Law, Hofstra
University.
1. The definition of a section 501(c)(4) organization is stated in the Internal Revenue Code
as follows:
Civic leagues 'or organizations not organized for profit but operated exclusively for the
promotion of social welfare, or local associations of employees, the membership of
which is limited to the employees of a designated person or persons in a particular
municipality, and the net earnings of which are devoted exclusively to charitable,
educational, or recreational purposes.
I.R.C. § 501(c)(4) (2012).
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believed that assembling a broad coalition of stakeholders would be the
best way to mount a meaningful challenge.
While reaching out to local organizations, A-Org also called the
nearby law school's Community Economic Development ("CED")
Clinic. A-Org asked the CED Clinic to help it draft a survey for groups
that might ultimately form a coalition with A-Org. The survey aimed to
identify aspects of the proposed development that might have
community support, points of shared concern about the proposal, and
potential advocacy partners who might join A-Org in a fight to make the
project work better for the community. A-Org and the CED Clinic
agreed that they would discuss whether there would be any legal work
after the survey results were in and after A-Org had a clearer sense of the
views of other groups in the area.
After reviewing the survey results, A-Org decided to invite all the
groups that filled out the survey to join with them to discuss forming a
coalition (the "Coalition"). Over the course of a series of meetings, the
groups that in fact decided to join the Coalition agreed to support a
statement of broad principles, including: the developer should tell the
public how many units of affordable housing would be built and how
affordability would be measured; the developer should provide an
estimate of how many jobs the project would likely create and whether
or not those jobs would be short-term or permanent; and the developer
should provide some basic protections for renters and small business
owners who would otherwise be displaced.
The CED Clinic and the Coalition then agreed that the Clinic would
represent the Coalition-and not A-Org as an individual member. The
Clinic therefore entered into a written retainer agreement with the
Coalition signed by the appropriate representatives of all of its thirty-five
members: twenty non-profit organizations and fifteen small businesses.
The CED Clinic agreed that it would help the Coalition with
transactional legal matters related to the development of a CBA,
including: counseling on possible advocacy strategies and researching
potential provisions; advising the Coalition on how best to utilize
the public comment period offered by the state land use process;
and negotiating the terms of any CBA with the developer and
local government.
Initially, there was some division between non-profit members of
the Coalition, which were primarily concerned about employment and
housing issues, and small business members, which were primarily
concerned with maintaining their commercial tenancies in local
buildings. Specifically, the small business owners worried that their
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buildings would be sold to the developer, who would then force the
small businesses out.
At the Coalition's request, the CED Clinic helped the Coalition's
members to draft a brief Memorandum of Understanding ("MOU") that
outlined basic rules for the group's operations based on the processes
that had developed over the course of the Coalition's first few meetings.
In keeping with the general consensus of the Coalition members, the
MOU was brief, principally stating that most decisions would require
majority approval based on a one-member, one-vote rule. Pursuant to the
MOU, non-profit members could vote on all issues, but small business
owners were only allowed to vote on issues directly connected to
protections for their businesses.
From the very start of the representation, the CED Clinic's legal
work and the Coalition's organizing took place in a context of extreme
time pressure. The developer and local government leaders were pushing
to approve zoning changes and sell government-owned properties to the
developer within weeks after the Coalition's launch.
As one of the most sophisticated members of the Coalition-the
founding organization and one of the few members with full-time staff
who could devote their time to this project-A-Org became the
Coalition's central coordinator. As a result, A-Org and the CED Clinic
came to develop a direct line of communication, although A-Org's role
as the Coalition's leader remained informal.
While A-Org and the Coalition generally followed the one-member,
one-vote rule laid out in the MOU, some of A-Org's staff made requests
directly to CED Clinic students. For instance, it became clear that A-Org
wanted to make the interests of the small business owners a focus of the
Coalition's advocacy, likely because A-Org believed the businesses
would have more influence with local elected officials than churches or
tenant groups. In order to encourage the small business owners to be
more vocal about the risks they faced in the Coalition's meetings with
local elected officials, at public hearings, and in meetings with the
powerful Chamber of Commerce, A-Org sometimes pressed the Clinic
to do things for small business members that the Clinic would not have
the resources to do for other members-like make a presentation to three
small business members on how the developer's plans were likely to
impact the specific block where their storefronts were located. Although
all Coalition members were invited to this presentation, it was targeted
to the small business owners and came about because of A-Org's focus
on small business issues. The broader Coalition never made a decision to
prioritize small business concerns. Although not appearing to be in
violation of the terms of the MOU, which did not address how
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information could be shared or discussed outside of twice-weekly allmember meetings, CED Clinic students felt that this focus on business
owners may have been unfair to other members of the Coalition.
Given these case facts, consider the following questions:
1. What should have been done to clarify the role of the CED Clinic at
the outset? Did the Clinic lawyer have an ethical duty to encourage the
Coalition to vote to formalize A-Org's role, even if the time-sensitivity
of the effort meant that further discussions around internal procedures
had the potential to distract from the Coalition's important advocacy
efforts?
2. Were there any conflicts of interest that arose from the Clinic's
representation of the Coalition while dealing with A-Org as informal
leader? What, if anything, might the Clinic have done to avoid or
minimize any conflicts?
II. ANALYSIS
A. OrganizationalRepresentationIssues
Questions one and two are related in that it is the Clinic's failure to
clarify A-Org's role that gives rise to the concern about conflicts of
interest. The issue is who has authority to speak on behalf of the
Coalition as client and what responsibilities, if any, the Clinic has in
helping to create a clear decision-making structure for the Coalition.
Rule 1.13 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct states only
that a lawyer for an organization has a duty to represent the entity
through its "duly authorized constituents."2 The rule, however, gives no
guidance on how to structure decision-making bodies and processes,
permitting the lawyer to make her own determination about whether to
take a more or less interventionist approach. This issue is particularly
thorny in the context of coalition representation, in which larger, more
powerful groups may hold sway. A lawyer representing a coalition may
instruct the group on basic principles for good group decision making
and allow the group to decide how it wants to move forward.
Alternatively, the lawyer may direct the group more firmly, encouraging
it, for example, to set up its structure in a way that protects the voices of
3
less powerful constituents within the coalition.

2.

MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.13(a) (AM. BAR ASS'N 2018).

3. Stephen Ellmann has done a detailed analysis of these options. See Stephen Ellmann,
Client-CenterednessMultiplied: IndividualAutonomy and Collective Mobilization in PublicInterest
Lawyers'Representationof Groups, 78 VA. L. REV. 1103, 1120-22 (1992).
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In the case facts presented above, when the Coalition is formed, the
member groups and the Clinic lawyer establish some rules governing
how the group will function and make important decisions. To codify
those rules, Coalition members sign a brief MOU, which establishes a
basic procedure for voting on proposals before the Coalition and limits
small businesses' voting rights. While these provisions are crucial, they
turn out to be insufficient as a tool for making thoughtful decisions
regarding routine matters where important de facto organizational
practices emerge over time, without any formal vote.
We see two important ethical issues in this scenario. The first
relates to the formal limitation of the small business owner members'
voting rights. The second is A-Org's emergent role as the leader of the
Coalition's work and the principal point of contact with the Coalition's
legal counsel.
With respect to the small business owner members, they are in the
minority of the Coalition (fifteen of thirty-five members), and the lawyer
therefore might be concerned that their interests are not adequately
represented in Coalition decision making. Indeed, precisely because of
their minority status, one might be concerned that the limitation on their
Coalition voting rights is a product of their structural lack of power. The
Clinic could ethically treat this as an internal Coalition decision about a
fundamental aspect of group structure and thus defer; or the Clinic
lawyer could raise questions about whether this structure adequately
served the Coalition's broader goals, what the underlying rationale was,
whether everyone agreed with it, and whether the small business owners
understood and accepted what it meant. Particularly since A-Org later
emphasizes small business interests in its advocacy efforts, after the
MOU was created to limit the influence of small business members in
the Coalition, it seems that there are different views about the role of
small businesses in the CBA campaign that should have been more fully
aired and discussed at the outset.
With respect to A-Org's emerging leadership role, the lawyer might
be concerned that by permitting A-Org to coordinate the Coalition's
work, A-Org could come to exercise a degree of power over the group
that would be in tension with the egalitarian principles laid out in the
MOU. Although the case facts state that A-Org generally complied with
the one-member, one-vote principles of the Coalition, the facts also
indicate that A-Org was back channeling with Clinic students to advance
the interests of the small business owners. This, as we explore below, is
a situation rife with the potential for conflicts of interest.
In terms of designing the Coalition structure, it is always good
organizational practice for all members to approve, through their chosen
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decision-making process, a single member's leadership role. Our
question has to do with legal ethics: To what degree is it an ethical
obligation of the lawyer to cause the Coalition client to formally approve
A-Org's coordinating role?
A lawyer may be tempted to let leadership roles develop
organically among coalition members--either out of a client-centered
deference to the internal governance choices of the coalition or out of a
desire to see the most sophisticated, competent, or assertive members
take the lead in order to maximize effectiveness. This might especially
be the case in a context in which groups have committed to some
measure of organizational democracy and where external time pressures
mean that any delay in undertaking the substantive advocacy work
threatens to derail the entire effort.4
But there are good reasons for a lawyer to encourage the client to
pay attention to how the day-to-day work of a coalition is coordinated
and how coalition leaders communicate with counsel. Advocacy
coalitions, especially when they are relatively new, small, or informal,
can be easily influenced by a de facto coordinator, even one seeking in
good faith to advance the goals of the coalition as best as it can-which
appears to be true in these case facts.5 The de facto coordinator, even
when well-intentioned, threatens the integrity of the approved
governance processes of the coalition and the lawyer has an ethical
obligation to raise this with the coalition to avoid problems of
6
authorization and communication.
There are a few potential problems in the case facts. First, is the
Clinic lawyer taking direction from someone who is not a "duly
authorized" constituent, either because A-Org is not authorized to make
decisions at all or because A-Org is not duly authorized to make the
specific decisions in question? Absent express approval by the
Coalition's members, the lawyer cannot take direction from a de facto
leader. Allowing leadership roles to develop organically does not mean
that the leaders are "duly authorized" per Rule 1.13(a), which implies
some type of formal authorization from the Coalition itself. Even
assuming that A-Org is authorized to make decisions, there is the
additional problem of whether its decisions are so self-interested as to

4. Deference to internal organizational rules is likely commonplace in other forms of group
representation, even when it means that one party will dominate the group client. For instance, four
co-founders of a business might each own twenty-five percent of a firm, but one founder could still
dominate the decision-making process through assertiveness, a willingness to take on additional
administrative work, or because of different owners' risk tolerance.
5. See Ellmann, supra note 3, at 1148-53.
6. See infra Part H.B; see also MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.3, 1.4.
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amount to a breach of fiduciary duty, which could trigger the lawyer's
reporting up obligations under Rule 1.13(b), 7 or whether A-Org is
making decisions that are simply unwise, triggering the lawyer's duties
under Rule 1.1 and Rule 1.4 to make sure A-Org is better informed and
to advise against what the lawyer believes to be bad judgments.
In this scenario, the Clinic lawyer encounters the Coalition just as it
is forming, but there are significant issues that the lawyer should be
careful to explore, including the expectations of the various groups, how
they came to join the Coalition, whether any have separate legal counsel,
and whether the person claiming to speak on behalf of each group is
authorized to do so. It is often the case that individual member groups do
not fully understand that the lawyer represents the coalition as a whole
and not the individual members, and identifying this clearly in both
written and oral communication with members is essential.
Choices regarding how a coalition works with legal counsel may be
a quintessential part of client decision making under Rule 1.2. The
allocation of decision-making power between client and lawyer depends
in part on who is empowered to speak on behalf of a client and on what
issues. 8 For a coalition client without a formal hierarchy, clear guidelines
should be established early in the attorney-client relationship in order to
enable the lawyer to comply with Rule 1.2 without having to rely on
assumptions and mere apparent authority. A lawyer, of course, has
significant power to shape the priorities and strategy of a coalition client.
Therefore, a lawyer working with a coalition should encourage the
coalition client to develop a clear, multi-stakeholder process for how to
work with legal counsel in order to be certain that the coalition is driving
its own agenda-not the lawyer and not the single coalition member
tasked with administrative coordination of the legal work.
We conclude that it is a best ethical practice for the lawyer
representing a coalition to encourage the coalition to develop clear
processes around selecting people or groups responsible for specific dayto-day tasks, including coordination with the coalition's legal counsel.
Although there is no need for the specifics of the process to be defined
or controlled by the lawyer, the client should be given enough
information to appreciate how failing to have a clear policy on
7. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.13(b) ("If a lawyer for an organization knows
that an officer, employee or other person associated with the organization is engaged in action,
intends to act or refuses to act in a matter related to the representation that is a violation of a legal
obligation to the organization,... and that is likely to result in substantial injury to the organization,
then the lawyer shall proceed as is reasonably necessary in the best interest of the organization.
Unless the lawyer reasonably believes that it is not necessary in the best interest of the organization
to do so, the lawyer shall refer the matter to higher authority in the organization.").
8. See generally id. r. 1.2.
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communication can lead the lawyer to improperly understand the
priorities and perspectives of the full coalition, which has the potential to
impact the coalition's overall efforts. In short, a lawyer must have a clear
understanding of who the "duly authorized constituents" of the client
group are; identifying those representatives clearly at the outset is
critical to avoid ambiguity and potential conflicts later on.9
B. Conflict of Interest Issues
As discussed above, in representing a coalition of groups, where
each group member has its own governance structure and decisionmaking policies, a lawyer has an ethical duty to ensure: (1) that the
representatives of each group member participating in the coalition have
the authority to speak or act on behalf of that group, and (2) that the
coalition's leadership is duly authorized to act on behalf of the coalition
generally. In turn, each coalition member must be clear about whom,
exactly, the lawyer represents. We stress that the lawyer has to represent
the coalition as an entity and not each member individually. The lawyer
should make this clear at the outset, preferably in writing.
This clarity is essential to avoid conflicts of interest and to avoid
the risk that a member will misunderstand the lawyer's role representing
the entity. As we will discuss, avoiding conflicts in this scenario is
important because, should a conflict arise between the Coalition and any
one of its members, the Clinic could be required to withdraw from
representing the Coalition if it is unable to obtain consent from all
affected parties. Under Rule 1.16(a)(1), a lawyer must withdraw from
representing a client if such representation "will result in violation of the
rules of professional conduct," which of course includes representation
in the face of a prohibited conflict of interest.i1
In the case facts presented, we see two potential conflict issues,
each implicating the question of whether the Clinic has followed its duty
to represent the Coalition as an entity, rather than the interests of its
individual members.
The first conflict issue arises from how the Clinic came to represent
the Coalition in the first instance. A-Org spearheaded the initial
campaign against the developer and came to the Clinic after already
having engaged in preliminary organizing to lay the groundwork for
a CBA. A-Org's original request was for the Clinic to help it

9. Id. r. 1.13(a).
10. Id. r. 1.16(a)(1).
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conduct a survey of potential members as a foundation for pulling the
Coalition together.
There are a couple of potential problems here. One is that, by
undertaking the survey project, the Clinic could be understood to have
represented A-Org in a prior matter before the Coalition representation
in the CBA campaign. In this situation, A-Org would be considered a
past client. Whether this were true would depend on the extent to which
the survey project involved the Clinic in providing legal representation
to A-Org-as opposed to simply providing non-legal strategic or
capacity-building support. 1' It is not clear from the case facts whether
the survey support was provided in the context of what A-Org
reasonably understood to be the Clinic's broader commitment to help
A-Org legally structure the Coalition to mount a CBA campaign.12
Assuming the Clinic did represent A-Org in the survey matter, it
would be important for A-Org to understand that specific representation
had terminated, and the Clinic's full loyalty ran to the Coalition once the
Coalition was accepted as a client. The facts state this was the case. Yet
it must be stressed that the Clinic would want to avoid any ambiguity
that might arise from A-Org's belief that it still had a direct channel
to the Clinic stemming from its original engagement with regard to
the survey.
To be cautious, the Clinic might evaluate the situation under the
former client conflict rules set forth in Rule 1.9. Under this approach, the
Clinic would start by treating A-Org as a past client due to its
representation of A-Org in drafting the survey. Rule 1.9(a) prohibits
lawyers who have previously represented a client in a matter from
representing another "person" in the same or a substantially related
matter if that person's interests are materially adverse to those of the
former client, unless the former client gives informed, written consent.13
At the outset of the Coalition representation, although the matters are
11. Our position is that a lawyer may provide non-legal and non-law related services to clients
that do not implicate the rules of professional conduct. Although there are some things non-lawyers
can do (like lobbying) that become legal or law-related when done by a lawyer, there are other
actions, perhaps like survey preparation, that do not become law-related just by virtue of being done
by a lawyer. Rule 5.7 presumes that the Model Rules of Professional Conduct apply to all lawrelated services provided "in circumstance that are not distinct from the lawyer's provision of legal
services." Id. r. 5.7(a)(1). However, there is still a question of whether services like survey support
qualify as "law-related"-i.e., those that "might reasonably be performed in conjunction with and in
substance are related to the provision of legal services"-in the first instance. Id. r. 5.7(b). To clarify
that services are not contemplated as legal or law-related, it is advisable to clearly state that at the
outset of the work.
12. One way that the Clinic might have addressed this problem would have been to make
clear at the beginning that it was representing the Coalition to-be-formed.
13. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.9(a).
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substantially related, there is nothing to suggest that there is any material
adversity since the Coalition's and A-Org's interests are aligned. One
could imagine divergence. For instance, the Coalition's other members
could vote to support a CBA deal that A-Org opposes. In that event, a
conflict could arise between the Coalition (of which A-Org is a part) and
A-Org itself. Although it might be preferable to consider such a
disagreement as simply one member getting outvoted pursuant to
Coalition rules, in the Rule 1.9 framework, this could be considered a
past client conflict that would require the informed written consent of AOrg to proceed.
The problem with this past client logic is that it would give A-Org
power to block the Clinic's representation of the Coalition if a conflict
occurred. To avoid this risk, the Clinic might consider drafting a
conflicts waiver at the outset, under which A-Org agreed to waive any
conflicts that might arise between it and the Coalition in the CBA
negotiation. The Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers takes a
cautious view of such waivers, disapproving of open-ended, general
agreements to consent to all future conflicts, though acknowledging that
clients with "sophistication in the matter" may be able to consent to
future conflicts, particularly those "that are familiar to the client." 4
However, as discussed below, this standard generally applies to waivers
of conflicts in concurrent representation. Waivers by past clients (as we
are treating A-Org here) of future conflicts in the same or substantially
related cases are disfavored. As the Seventh Circuit stated in the
successive conflict case of Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Gulf Oil
Corp.,15 "it is impossible to conclude that a client could ever have any
reasons to desire that information disclosed in confidence should be
16
utilized against him."'
Nonetheless, there are reasons to believe that a conflict waiver here
could be legitimate. The potential future conflict-that A-Org and the
Coalition disagree about the terms of a CBA--does not clearly place the
Clinic lawyer in the position of using A-Org's confidential information
against it. And it is important to stress that A-Org is the entity
motivating the creation of the Coalition in the first instance precisely to
give broader voice to other groups in shaping the terms of the CBA. In
this context, it seems like A-Org as a sophisticated actor should be able
to shift full decision making to the Coalition and full representational
power to the Clinic lawyer without the specter of a conflict undercutting
14.
2000).
15.
16.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 122 cmt. d (AM. LAW INST.

588 F.2d 221 (7th Cir. 1978).
Id. at 229.
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the Clinic's work. Under this logic, it would be prudent for the Clinic to
obtain a waiver of future conflicts from A-Org, taking care to be specific
about the nature of the potential conflicts that could arise and inviting AOrg to seek advice from outside counsel to ensure it understood the
waiver. Such a waiver from A-Org would be a good, if imperfect,
measure of protection for the Clinic's work for the Coalition in the event
that a material divergence in views between the Coalition and A-Org
were to arise.
Thus far, we have focused on whether the survey project created a
lawyer-client relationship between the Clinic and A-Org. But there is
another layer to consider. Specifically, the Clinic would also want to be
certain that, in conducting the survey, it did not take on the individual
representation of any other Coalition member groups by gaining access
to their confidential information and taking other actions that might give
rise to a reasonable inference of individual member representation. In
Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Kerr-McGee Corp.,7 a law firm
purporting to represent a trade group was held to have also represented
its members under a quasi-lawyer-client relationship theory when the
law firm conducted surveys of member group activities under conditions
in which the members reasonably believed they were being represented
and conveyed confidential information to the law firm.' 8
During the survey, the Clinic could avoid this problem by: (1)
making clear, in writing, that it represented the Coalition-to-be-formed
(not A-Org); (2) making clear, in writing, that it did not represent any of
the individual member groups being surveyed; and (3) taking care not to
convey the impression of member representation in any
communications. This would require the Clinic to have a mechanism for
ensuring that any identifiable confidential information acquired from the
members in the course of the survey would not be handled in such a way
as to give rise to an inference of individual member representation. If
any member reasonably believed that it was an individual client of the
Clinic as a result of the survey project (as was the case in Kerr-McGee),
then once again the Clinic could confront a conflict situation if the
individual member's interests ended up diverging from the Coalition's
interests during the course of CBA negotiation. If that occurred, and the
individual member refused to consent, the Clinic might have to
withdraw from representing the Coalition in the CBA matter. The Clinic
could avoid this outcome by making it clear in the retainer that member

17. 580 F.2d 1311 (7th Cir. 1978). This case came out of the same set of facts as the GulfOil
Corp. case discussed supra.
18. Id. at 1318-21.
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information collected in the survey would be for the use of the Coalition,
as the Clinic's client; that the Clinic would keep the information
confidential because of its duty to the Coalition; and that the Clinic did
not represent any of the9 Coalition members individually despite
1
collecting the information.
Building on this analysis, the second conflicts issue relates directly
to the Clinic's relationship with A-Org in the CBA matter. The Clinic's
retainer agreement should clearly state that it represents the Coalition
and not the individual Coalition members. However, the pre-existing and
ongoing relationship with A-Org raises ethical concerns. Earlier, we
discussed the consequences of treating A-Org as a past client. Here, we
want to focus on what would happen if A-Org was considered to be a
current client. Because of its prior relationship with the CED Clinic,
A-Org may reasonably believe that the Clinic continues to represent its
individual interests. If the Clinic is representing the Coalition and A-Org
reasonably believes, based on its ongoing direct access to the Clinic, that
the Clinic also represents A-Org, a current conflict of interest could
arise-and maybe already has arisen. Again, while the fact pattern does
not seem to show any direct adversity at this stage, as suggested earlier,
one could imagine conflicts arising over the final terms of the CBA, with
A-Org wanting features that other members reject. Even absent such a
direct conflict, Rule 1.7(a)(2) prohibits a lawyer from concurrently
representing multiple parties if "there is a significant risk that the
representation of one or more clients will be materially limited by the
lawyer's responsibilities to another client, a former client or a third
person or by a personal interest of the lawyer., 21 In this case, there could
be a conflict if the Clinic's advice to the Coalition were materially
limited by its strong relationship with A-Org, through which A-Org was
able to unduly influence what the Clinic lawyer understood the
Coalition's interests in the matter to be (for example, by pushing the
focus on small business concerns).
Although it may be possible for a lawyer to represent both the
Coalition and A-Org as joint clients, the lawyer should be careful to
strictly follow the requirements of Rule 1.7(b) to do so.2" Rule 1.7(b)
states that a lawyer facing a conflict of interest can nonetheless represent

19. If the Clinic does this and a member of the Coalition later withdraws over a disagreement,
the Clinic does not have a conflict under Rule 1.9 and can use the withdrawing member's
information for the Coalition's benefit. Ideally, the retainer would provide that the lawyer does not
represent members and that if a member withdraws the lawyer will continue to represent the
Coalition.
20. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDuCT r. 1.7(a)(2) (emphasis added).
21. See id.r. 1.7(b).
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multiple clients if each client gives informed, written consent and if the
lawyer reasonably believes that he or she "will be able to provide
competent and diligent representation to each affected client. ' 2 In this
context, even if the Clinic were able to obtain informed, written consent
from the other members of the Coalition, the Clinic lawyer would still
have to determine if she could reasonably provide competent and
diligent representation to both A-Org and the Coalition. The possibility
for differences of opinion might be too substantial, although we do not
have sufficient information to draw firm conclusions. Based on what we
do know, because the Coalition and A-Org are working toward the same
goal, it is likely that joint representation would be consentable.
In the joint client scenario, it would be legitimate at the outset of
the representation for the Clinic to obtain a waiver from A-Org under
which A-Org agreed to waive future conflicts between it and the
Coalition with respect to the CBA.23 Such a waiver would state that, in
the event of an irresolvable conflict, the Clinic would withdraw from
representing A-Org but continue to represent the Coalition. Courts
upholding such waivers stress the importance of fairness to the waiving
party, paying particular attention to the sophistication of that party to
understand the material risk of consenting to the waiver, consistent with
Comment 22 to Rule 1.7.24
22. Id. r. 1.7(b)(1).
23. These types of waivers are typical in law firm practice, although their enforcement has
been uneven. See Elena Postnikova, Conflict Waivers that Do Not Cure Conflicts: Apparent
Inconsistency in the Jurisprudence Governing Advance Waivers and How These Waivers Can
Become More Effective, 28 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICs 839, 840 (2015) (noting that in recent decades,
firms' "ability to rely on advance waivers of conflict .. became essential for supporting continuous
growth of legal business across jurisdictions;"); Mary Strother & Dyane O'Leary, Advance Conflict
Waivers: Will They Work for You?, 54-SuM. B. B.J. 12, 13 (2010) (arguing that in large law firms,
advance waivers "will become an even more essential and standard practice"). For cases
invalidating waivers because of overbreadth or lack of consent, see generally, In re Congoleum
Corp., 426 F.3d 675 (3d Cir. 2005) (finding that New Jersey ethics rules require "truly informed
consent," which individual clients had not given in the context of complicated bankruptcy
proceedings); Western Sugar Coop. v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., 98 F. Supp. 3d 1074 (C.D. Cal.
2015) (declining to enforce waiver because it was overly broad, lacking specificity as to who the
potentially adverse client might be and the type of potential conflict being waived); Celgene Corp.
v. KV Pharm. Co., 2008 WL 2937415 (D.N.J. 2008) (invalidating waiver because it was openended, vague, and there was inadequate disclosure of the lawyer's plans and client's options); and
Concat LP v. Unilever PLC, 350 F. Supp. 2d 796 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (declining to enforce waiver
because it was overly general and unlimited in temporal scope).
24. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.7 cmt. 22 (stating that a waiver's effectiveness
"is generally determined by the extent to which the client reasonably understands the material risks
that the waiver entails"). For an analysis of the effectiveness of waivers, see ABA Formal Opinion
05-436, Informed Consent to Future Conflicts of Interest (May 11, 2005). For more on this subject,
see Galderma Labs., L.P. v. Actavis Mid Atlantic LLC, 927 F. Supp. 2d 390, 405 (N.D. Tex. Feb.
21, 2013) (stating that, following the update to Comment 22 to Rule 1.7, "the test for informed
consent is whether the client understands the material risks involved in waiving the future conflict"
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The complications of joint representation argue in favor of avoiding
it altogether. As we have suggested, there were two routes for the Clinic
to do that here. One was to make clear during the survey project that the
Clinic represented the Coalition-to-be-formed, not A-Org. Once the
Coalition was in fact formed, the Clinic's duties would have continued
to flow to that entity. Absent that (i.e., if the Clinic represented A-Org in
the initial survey matter), the best practice would be for the Clinic to
draft a clear termination letter after completion of the survey and before
undertaking representation of the Coalition in the CBA matter.
As a final point, we believe that it was essential for the Clinic to
have communicated with the entire Coalition in advance about its
planned presentation for small business owners (requested by A-Org)
and discussed the implications of the presentation for the CBA process.
This was required by Rule 1.4 (on communications with clients) and 1.3
(on diligent representation).2 5 If the Coalition supported the presentation
as part of the overall campaign, it could have proceeded with client
authorization. If the Coalition opposed the presentation, then it should
not have occurred irrespective of A-Org's belief that it was important. In
the case facts, the Clinic did not receive prior Coalition consent for the
presentation, but it appears no member ultimately objected to it.
However, it would be wise for the Clinic to avoid the possibility of
having to defend the presentation to objecting Coalition members after
the fact, which would raise conflict concerns with A-Org and damage
overall trust.
In general, when a lawyer finds herself dealing with the unofficial
leader of a coalition client, it is best to formalize the leader's position as
soon as possible and avoid back-channel communications in the
meantime. If the unofficial leader wants to become the coalition's duly
appointed representative or legal contact, that role needs to be approved
through the coalition's formal decision-making process.
At the outset of the representation, it would be even better for a
coalition to establish a committee composed of a diverse range of
representatives from the member groups charged with communicating
with the lawyer. This would not only facilitate good internal governance
and that a lawyer "need not inform the client through additional consultation of facts or implications
already known to the client"); and Visa U.S.A., Inc. v. First Data Corp., 241 F. Supp. 2d 1100, 1106
(N.D. Cal. 2003) (finding that a firm could simultaneously represent adverse parties when an
advance waiver had been executed based on an analysis of the breadth of the waiver, whether the
waiver attempted to waive a current conflict or all future conflicts, whether the conflicts were fully
discussed between lawyer and client, the specificity of the waiver, the nature of the actual conflict
and whether it arose in the same or unrelated disputes, the client's sophistication, and the interests
of justice).
25. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.3 cmt. 4, r. 1.4 cmt. 2.
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on the part of the coalition, it would help avoid any potential claims by
other coalition members against the lawyer based on the ethical
obligations in Rule 1.13 (the lawyer represents the organization through
its duly authorized constituents),26 or based on the ethical duties of
competence (Rule 1.1),27 diligence (Rule 1.3),28 and communication
(Rule 1.4).29 Overall, to avoid the complications outlined in this analysis,
it is crucial for the lawyer to clearly articulate: (1) the nature of the
organizational client, (2) the authorized leadership group, and (3) the
appropriate means for communication and decision making.
III. KEY TAKEAWAYS
In conclusion, from a best practice standpoint, we underline the
following takeaways from the analysis above:
1. In order to avoid future conflicts of interest between the
Coalition and the group that spearheads its formation (A-Org), it is
advisable to either: (a) not represent A-Org in the initial survey matter (if
it is clear that the Clinic will subsequently represent the Coalition); (b)
make clear that the Clinic is representing the Coalition to-be-formed,
and not A-Org, preferably in writing; or (c) explicitly terminate the
A-Org representation after the survey project is completed and have AOrg waive future conflicts with the Coalition.
2. In forming the Coalition, it is advisable to make the terms of the
representation explicit in writing. For example, the Clinic should have
advised Coalition members that: (a) the Clinic represents the Coalition
as an entity and not its members individually; (b) the Clinic may use the
members' information for the Coalition's benefit; and (c) if any member
withdraws from the Coalition over a disagreement, the Clinic will
continue to represent the Coalition.
3. It is advisable for the Clinic to ascertain precisely how different
kinds of decisions relating to the representation will be made by the
Coalition, including the extent to which one or more members are
authorized to make certain decisions on behalf of the Coalition and
which decisions they are authorized to make. In every group
representation context, the group needs a contact point with authority to
make time-sensitive decisions and to consult with the lawyer. In this
scenario, the problem was not that A-Org was a poor choice as an

26.
27.
28.
29.

Id r. 1.13.
Id. r 1.
.
Id. r. 1.3.
Id r. 1.4.
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authorized constituent to make decisions for the Coalition and
communicate on its behalf. In fact, given its role in the community and
starting the Coalition, it may have been a perfect candidate for that role.
The point is that designation, along with the Coalition's voting rules,
should be clearly set forth in the Coalition's MOU.
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